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PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE AND FEDERALISM
BRIAN H. BIx*
INTRODUCTION
Law is often concerned with deciding who decides. The
legal process school of the last generation was built around
inquiries into institutional competence and the legal profession's
(purported) expertise at finding the right procedures for each
type of decision.' Within the American political system, the ques-
tion of who decides is also often quite prominent: at what level
the decision should be made (individual, municipal, state, or fed-
eral), and by what sort of institution (individual, family, adminis-
trative agency, court, or legislature).
This focus on the process of decision, to the point where pro-
cess almost seems to be more important than outcome, is also
present, though in a different form, in the area of medical deci-
sion-making. With controversial medical treatment decisions-
for example, "right to die" decisions, medical treatment deci-
sions for severely handicapped infants, and decisions for the
legally incompetent-a focus on adding required procedures
and decision-makers may be a way of dealing with our own con-
flicting views about whom to trust and whom not to trust (some-
times we prefer distance and objectivity, sometime closeness and
connection) .2
The question of who decides is the focus of discussions of
federalism. The United States is a federal republic, with powers
and responsibilities divided between the federal government and
the states. This federalist system has consequences for the way
issues are considered in this country, and physician-assisted sui-
cide is no exception. This article will situate the problem of phy-
* Frederick W. Thomas Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of
Minnesota. I am grateful to Stephen R. Latham and Marc Spindelman for their
comments and suggestions.
1. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). For a more recent analysis, see, for example, NEIL
K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAw, ECO-
NOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2000).
2. The best discussion of these issues is still Martha Minow, Beyond State
Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 933 (1985),
which looks at those issues in the context of medical decisions for severely
handicapped infants.
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sician-assisted suicide within the legal and social-science
literature on federalism. Part I considers the interaction of deci-
sion-makers within the American federal system: how the deci-
sions of individual states can have extra-territorial effects, and
how such effects have been treated within American constitu-
tional law and in recent federal policy debates, including the
debates over physician-assisted suicide. Part II takes a step back
to look at some general theories from political science and eco-
nomics regarding federalism, and considers the implications of
those theories for physician-assisted suicide.
I. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN STATES AND BETWEEN STATE
GOVERNMENTS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The basic notion of American federalism is that decisions
are divided between the central, national government and the
individual states.3 Additionally, within the states, power is fre-
quently devolved further to municipalities and other entities;
however, for present purposes, the article will focus almost exclu-
sively on the choice between federal and state regulation. In the
practice of American federalism, various themes have emerged:
in particular, the idea of states as experimental laboratories; and
the tension between state autonomy, national citizenship, and
federal governmental initiatives.
A. States as Laboratories
Justice Louis Brandeis famously described the value of feder-
alism in terms of how the states can try out new programs and
approaches-the states as "laboratories":
To say experimentation in things social and economic is a
grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may
be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a sin-
gle courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
3. While those within the American political tradition usually speak of
"federalism," the notion of "subsidiarity" within the European tradition is simi-
lar. For example, the Treaty Establishing the European Community states: "In
areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the pro-
posed action, be better achieved by the Community." CONSOLIDATED VERSION
OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Article 5 (ex Article
3b), available at http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/treaties/dat/ec_cons-
treatyen.pdf (1997) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Pub-
lic Policy).
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laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.4
Thus, states are generally to be encouraged to try out new
approaches to dealing with social, and even moral, problems. At
the same time, one need not assume that experimentation is
always valuable for its own sake, any more than one should
assume that liberty is valuable, however it might be used.5 We
might rightly resist allowing certain states to "experiment" with
slavery, torture, or involuntary euthanasia.6 One justification for
federal intervention would be the belief that certain matters
should be beyond the scope of state choice.
The notion of using the state as experimental laboratories is
also connected with the desire of the federal courts (and, to
some extent, Congress) not to intervene on issues until the con-
sequences of various approaches have become clearer through
actual practice. The United State Supreme Court decisions that
refused to recognize a constitutional right to physician-assisted
suicide, Washington v. Glucksber-' and Vacco v. Quill,8 contained
numerous references to the on-going state "experimentations"
on the issue,9 indicating, perhaps, that one problem with the
challenges in those cases was that they were brought too early.
Oregon is currently the only "laboratory" in the United
States experimenting with physician-assisted suicide. In the 2000
Election, Maine narrowly defeated a ballot measure which would
have allowed physician-assisted suicide.1" Similar initiatives had
also been defeated in Washington in 1991 and in California in
4. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,J.,
dissenting).
5. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not as Limits, But as Empowerment, 45
KAN. L. REv. 1219, 1235-36 (1997). On questioning whether liberty is always
valuable, regardless of its use, see James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fra-
ternity, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY AND THREE BRIEF ESSAYS 135-78 (Univ.
Chicago Press 1991) (1873) ("The Doctrine of Liberty in its Application to
Morals"); JosEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 1-19 (1986).
6. Of course, there are some who consider physician-assisted suicide to be
equally a clear evil, on which experimentation should not be allowed.
7. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
8. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
9. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719, 735; id. at 737 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring); id. at 738 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 786-89
(Souter,J., concurring in the judgment).
10. The Maine Death with Dignity Act, which seems to have been based
largely on the Oregon law, was defeated on November 7, 2000, by a vote of
332,280 to 315,031, thus a difference of only about 2.7% of all the votes cast.
See Referendum Election Tabulations: November 7, 2000, reproduced at http://www.
state.me.us/sos/cec/elec/2000g/genOOr-s.htm (on file with the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
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1993.11 Finally, the Hawaii legislature defeated a comparable
proposal in 2002.12 Of course, experimentation on this issue is
also going on in other countries,' 3 and there is no reason why
Americans should not try to learn from foreign experiences.
14
B. Extra-Territorial Effects (the Examples of Marriage,
Divorce, and Welfare)
The flip-side of seeing each state as a laboratory for experi-
mentation within our multi-state federal system, is to note how
often the combination of normal practices and constitutional
doctrines can cause a single state's decisions to have nation-wide
effects.
The most famous recent example of this phenomenon came
when first Hawaii and later Vermont threatened to recognize
same-sex marriages. In both cases, same-sex couples had chal-
lenged, on the basis of state constitutional protections, decisions
not to allow them to marry.15 The Hawaii "threat" was eventually
foreclosed by a referendum that modified the state constitution
to authorize legislation confining marriage to opposite-sex
couples. 6 The Vermont litigation resulted in a court order that
the state legislature either extend marriage to same-sex couples or
create an alternative institution that would give same-sex couples
all the (state-law) benefits of marriage. The Vermont Legislature
chose the second option, creating "civil unions" for same-sex
couples.' 7
Before either state had resolved the legal challenges, the
federal government became involved in the debate. The federal
intervention was based on concerns arising from the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings by every
other State. And the Congress may by general Laws pre-
11. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 716-17.
12. Michele Kayal, National Briefing: Hawaii-Defeat on Assisted Suicide, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 2002, at A10.
13. See Euthanasia Bill is Okd in Parliament, L.A. TIMES, May 17, 2002, at A4
(Belgium right-to-die bill); David Lister, Euthanasia Made Legal in Holland, TIMES
(London), Apr. 11, 2001, at 1; Marlise Simons, Dutch Becoming First Nation to
Legalize Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2000, at A3.
14. Cf Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 734 (discussing a 1990 Dutch government
study that summarized that country's experience).
15. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Baehr v. Lewin, 852
P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
16. Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (On the basis of the refer-
endum, the original court challenge was dismissed as moot.).
17. 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91, § 1.
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scribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Pro-
ceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.' 8
The Full Faith and Credit Clause has been held to require one
state to enforce the valid divorce judgments of another state."
This seemed to allow one state with, say, relatively easy standards
for gaining access to divorce to undermine the policies of states
that had more restrictive standards. The only thing that pre-
vented the easy-divorce states from entirely undermining the poli-
cies of the difficult-divorce states was the rule that states have the
power to grant divorces only if the petitioning spouse was a domi-
cile of the state in question. Such a standard is one that those
merely visiting for the weekend (or even for the summer) could
not meet.
20
The Full Faith and Credit Clause clearly applies to divorce
decrees, because they are judgments of the court ('judicial Pro-
ceedings" under the clause). It is far less clear that marriages are
covered by the clause. Marriages are not 'judicial Proceedings,"
nor are they in any obvious way the "public Acts [or] Records" of
the state. If a marriage celebrated in one state is binding in
another state under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, it is
because of the "full faith and credit" each state must grant the
laws under which the marriage was celebrated.2 Nonetheless,
many people worried that if same-sex marriages were to be valid
in one state, other states might be legally bound to recognize
those marriages, even if those other states had a strong public
policy against recognition of such marriages.2 2 This may have
18. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
19. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
20. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (holding that
another jurisdiction had the right to question the jurisdictional basis of a migra-
tory divorce before granting the divorce-granting state's decree full faith and
credit); see also Fink v. Fink, 346 N.E.2d 415 (I11. App. Ct. 1976) (refusing to give
full faith and credit to a Nevada divorce; holding that the husband had not
obtained domiciliary status in Nevada despite his significant efforts to do so).
21. See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitu-
tional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1976, 1999 (1997).
There would similarly seem to be "full faith and credit" limits on other states'
abilities to penalize an estate because the deceased had taken advantage of the
Oregon physician-assisted suicide legislation, because it is one of "the public
Acts" to which full faith and credit must be given.
22. The Full Faith and Credit Clause creates federal constitutional law
that binds the states regarding their freedom to recognize or not recognize the
laws and judgments of other states. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S.
222, 233 (1998) (declaring that there is no "roving 'public policy exception' to
the full faith and credit due judgments").
However, at a different level from the constitutional strictures of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, there are the traditional principles of conflict of laws, under
2003]
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been a baseless fear, 3 but it was the basic justification for the
passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).24 DOMA
authorized states not to recognize same-sex marriages if they so
desired,2 5 thus reducing the fear that recognition of same-sex
marriage by one state would impinge on the marriage policies of
other states.
Thus, DOMA tries to answer one problem of American fed-
eralism: how can one require states to respect the laws and judg-
ments of other states without simultaneously giving each state the
power potentially to undermine the policies of every other state?
DOMA does this by giving each state the limited power not to
recognize certain sorts of marriages entered into in other states.
However, the basic tension of American federalism inevita-
bly remains: the problem of simultaneously granting significant
autonomy to the individual states while maintaining a national
identity and rights of national citizenship. For example, while
Utah might be authorized by DOMA to prevent Vermont deci-
sions on same-sex marriage from "infecting" Utah's policies
regarding whom to give the benefits of marriage, Vermont has
no reciprocal power to prevent Utah residents from moving to
which a marriage which is valid where celebrated will be recognized in other
jurisdictions. However, conflict of laws principles (unlike Full Faith and Credit,
see supra Baker) recognizes an exception when the marriage "violates the strong
public policy of another state .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 283(2) (1971).
23. Arguably baseless because other states would probably not be bound
to recognize a marriage by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and standard con-
flict of laws principles would likely allow states to deny enforcement under a
"public policy" exception. See supra text accompanying note 22.
24. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (1997
& Supp. 2002), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (Supp. 2002)).
25. DOMA states:
No State .. .shall be required to give effect to any public act, record,
or judicial proceeding of any other State ... respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under
the laws of such other State . . . , or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (2002).
The constitutional status of DOMA is highly contested. Some argue that Con-
gress was merely acting under the express authorization of the Full Faith and
Credit Act: "And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1. Others argue that this power granted to
Congress operates only on the margins, and does not give Congress the power
to authorize states not to recognize the laws of other states. See, e.g., I LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-35, at 1247 n.49 (3d ed. 2000).
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Vermont to take advantage of Vermont's civil unions law.26 It is
part of constitutional federalism that states have no power to
deny access of laws or benefits to someone simply because they
are new to the state. This point was reaffirmed in the 1999
Supreme Court decision of Saenz v. Roe,2 7 where the Court invali-
dated a California statute that limited the welfare benefits availa-
ble to newly arrived residents.28 This was held to violate the
constitutional right to interstate travel.2"
At the same time, the United States Supreme Court has
allowed states to impose residence-durational requirements, at
least on some benefits offered by the states. In Sosna v. Iowa,3 °
the Court upheld Iowa's one-year residency requirement for
obtaining a divorce in the Iowa courts. In upholding the resi-
dency requirement, the Court stated that it
furthers the State's parallel interests both in avoiding offi-
cious intermeddling in matters in which another State has
a paramount interest, and in minimizing the susceptibility
of its own divorce decrees to collateral attack. A State such
as Iowa may quite reasonably decide that it does not wish
to become a divorce mill for unhappy spouses .... 31
Thus, the Supreme Court has expressly affirmed as legitimate a
state's interest in not becoming a magnet to out-of-state citizens,
based on the services or benefits it offers.32
26. With new institutional options like civil unions, the pressure is likely
to be in the opposite direction: for Vermont to use the availability of "civil
unions" as an enticement for tourism and immigration from other states. See,
e.g., Jennifer G. Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recog-
nize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1995); Carey Goldberg, Gays and
Lesbians Head for Vermont to Make It Legal, But How Legal Is It?, N.Y. TiMES, July 23,
2000, at 12 (reporting that "[s]ome town clerks [in Vermont] report that two-
thirds or more of the certificates they issue are to out-of-staters.").
As will be discussed shortly, the states do not have the power to foreclose offering
a benefit to a new resident, but they do have the right, in most instances, to delay
making the benefit available.
27. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
28. California has one of the most generous welfare programs in the
nation. It hoped to save money by limiting new residents during their first year
in the state to the benefits they would have received in the states of their prior
residence. Id. at 492.
29. A doctrine introduced in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
see also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
30. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
31. Id. at 407.
32. However, a comparable argument for welfare benefits has been twice
rejected. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Though the Court has made the effort to treat the decisions in Shapiro, Sosna,
and Saenz as consistent, it is not easy to do. Compare Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505
(majority opinion), and Sosna, 419 U.S. at 405-10 (majority opinion), with
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A state might thus create a residency, or duration-of-resi-
dency requirement, both to prevent unwanted travel by outsiders
merely to take advantage of an in-state benefit,3 and to lessen
concerns and hostility of other states based on the way the state's
laws and benefits might undermine the policies of other states (a
theme approved by the Supreme Court in its discussion in Sosna
of Iowa's duration-of-residency requirement for divorce). With
physician-assisted suicide, the second concern seems likely more
compelling than the first.
The Oregon statute imposes a residency requirement, thus
minimizing its extraterritorial effects. No one qualifies to use
legal physician-assisted suicide who is not a "resident of Ore-
gon."34  While no bright-line rule is given for determining
whether someone is an Oregon resident,3 5 the statute points to
four factors: having an Oregon driver's license; having registered
to vote in the state; leasing or owning property in the state; and
having filed an Oregon tax return for the most recent tax year.36
Therefore, merely traveling to Oregon for a long weekend, or an
extended vacation, would be insufficient to qualify someone to
seek physician-assisted suicide under the Oregon Act. One need
not fear "death tourism. 3 ' However, as discussed above, there is
no constraint on the ability of United States citizens to move
from some other state to Oregon with the intention of taking
advantage of the statute once settled there as full-time residents.
There might yet be state-state policy interference in the
other direction: decisions by other states that have the purpose
or effect of undermining Oregon's legalization of physician-
assisted suicide (federal interference with Oregon's policy will be
discussed in the next section). For example, consider the situa-
tion of physicians licensed in more than one state: what if Idaho
sought to revoke a physician's license on the basis that this doc-
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 511-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), and Sosna, 419 U.S. at
418-27 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33. Though there are limits on the state's power to do this, at least when
welfare benefits are involved, as the Saenz and Shapiro decisions indicate.
34. OR. REV. STAT. 127.805 § 2.01 (2001); see also id., 127.800 § 1.01 (11)
(defining "qualified patient" for the purpose of the Act as "a capable adult who
is a resident of Oregon and has satisfied the requirements of [the Act]"); id.,
127.860 § 3.10 ("Only requests made by Oregon residents . . . shall be
granted.").
35. See id., 127.860 § 3.10 ("Factors demonstrating Oregon residency
include but are not limited to [the four factors listed].").
36. Id.
37. Cf Fiona Fleck, Swiss Group Said to Push 'Suicide Tourism, NAT'L POST,
Aug. 26, 2002, at A14; David Lister, Death Tourism'Fear as Dutch Back Euthanasia,
TIMES (London), Apr. 11, 2001, at 17.
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tor had participated in an assisted suicide? It is quite possible
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause would preclude that sort of
interference (on the basis that it would be a failure on Idaho's
part to give full faith and credit to the "public Acts" of Oregon),
but that legal question is far from fully settled.
C. Federal Intervention
The federal government has already stepped in, to a limited
extent, to constrain state experimentation in the area of physi-
cian-assisted suicide, and some federal officials have tried to end
the experiment entirely.
The first form of federal intervention with the Oregon legis-
lation in fact came neither from the legislative branch nor from
the executive branch, but from the judicial branch. The legisla-
tion legalizing physician-assisted suicide, after being passed in a
November 1994 referendum, was supposed to go into effect in
December 1994. However, a federal district court enjoined
implementation of the Act, on the basis of a lawsuit which
claimed that the legislation violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.3" However, the district court decision was overturned by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States
Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal.39
38. The preliminary injunction, and its justification, appears in Lee v.
Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994). The permanent injunction appears
in Lee v. State, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Lee v. Oregon,
107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 927 (1997).
The initial suit was brought by "two physicians, four terminally ill or potentially
terminally ill patients, a residential care facility, and individual operators of resi-
dential care facilities." Lee, 869 F. Supp. at 1493. The plaintiffs claimed that the
Act violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as the First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion
and association, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. The eventual
injunction was based only on the Equal Protection claim. Id. at 1437. The
court stated:
[The Oregon Act] provides a means to commit suicide to a severely
overinclusive class who may be competent, incompetent, unduly influ-
enced, or abused by others. The state interest and the disparate treat-
ment are not rationally related and [the Act], therefore, violates the
Constitution of the United States.
Id. (footnote omitted).
39. Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 927
(1997).
The Circuit Court decision was grounded on the fact that none of the plaintiffs
had the requisite standing to challenge the statute and their claims lacked
"ripeness"-that is, that the plaintiffs could not claim actual harm from the Act,
or any imminent harm that was more than highly speculative. Id. at 1387-92.
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The injunction against implementation of the Oregon legis-
lation had been lifted on October 27, 1997, and in November of
the same year, Oregon voters rejected by a margin of 60% to
40% a referendum effort to repeal the legislation.4 ° (Sixteen
patients died ingesting legally prescribed lethal medication in
1998; twenty-seven in 1999; twenty-seven in 2000; and twenty-one
in 2001.)41
The Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of
1997 was a more "successful" federal intervention, prohibiting
the use of federal funds in support of physician-assisted suicide.42
More extensive and constraining federal intervention has been
introduced, but has not (yet) been enacted. The Pain Relief Pro-
motion Act was introduced in the House and the Senate in both
1999 and 2000, and was in fact passed by the House in October
1999 before it died in the Senate." That Act would, among
other things, have made it illegal to use a federally controlled
substance in physician-assisted suicide (and most commentators
viewed blocking physician-assisted suicide in Oregon as this Act's
main purpose). 44
On November 6, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft sent
a letter to the Drug Enforcement Administration, a copy of
which was published in the Federal Register, stating that assisting
suicide was not a "legitimate medical purpose," and therefore the
use of controlled substances to effect that purpose would violate
the Controlled Substances Act,4 5 and make a physician's license
subject to suspension or revocation if she prescribed controlled
40. See OR. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON ORE-
GON'S DEATH WITH DIGNITY Acr 6 (2002), available at http://www.ohd.hr.state.
or.us/chs/pas/Olpasrpt.pdf (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Eth-
ics & Public Policy).
41. See id. at 3.
42. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14401 (Supp. 2002). The statute extends the prohibi-
tion of federal funding also to euthanasia and mercy killing. Id.
43. H.R. 2260 passed the House of Representatives on October 27, 1999,
by a vote of 271-156. In the Senate, it was reported favorably out of the Judici-
ary Committee on May 23, 2000, but received no further attention before the
106th Congress ended (legislative history available at http://thomas.loc.gov/);
see alsoJim Barnett, Legislative Action on the Suicide Law is Not Expected Soon, ORE-
GONIAN, Apr. 18, 2002, at Al. No new federal legislation is expected in the
107th Congress.
44. In 1998, President Clinton's Attorney General, Janet Reno, had ruled
that the federal controlled substances legislation did not preclude the medical
use of such substances, including physician-assisted suicide. Jim Barnett, Bush
May Act on Assisted Suicide, OREGONIAN, Feb. 2, 2001, at A7.
45. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-950 (1999 & Supp. 2002).
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substances for that purpose of assisting suicide.46 The State of
Oregon subsequently filed a complaint in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Oregon, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief from the Attorney General's Directive.47 Judge
Robert E. Jones initially granted temporary relief, and eventually
granted a permanent injunction against enforcement of the
Directive.48 The District Court grounded the injunction on the
conclusion that the Attorney General's actions had exceeded his
authority under the Controlled Substances Act.49
There is ample evidence that Oregon residents, whatever
their positions on the issue of physician-assisted suicide, generally
have not reacted well to the perceived federal interference with
what is perceived to be a state matter.5 0
II. THEORIES OF FEDERALISM
Within the political science and economics literature, there
are a variety of perspectives on the values and effects of federal-
ism. Those who theorize about the subject often seek ideas
about how the various levels of government should divide their
responsibilities. Two commentators summarized the prevailing
views as follows:
[T] hose who value a federal system typically do so for some
mix of three reasons: it encourages an efficient allocation of
national resources; it fosters political participation and a
sense of the democratic community; and it helps to protect
basic liberties and freedoms.5 1
Beyond these theories supportive of federalism and offering pre-
scriptions for its use, there are also theories, not always as support-
ive, about federalism's likely effects. The subsections that follow
will consider both supportive and more cynical/descriptive views
46. See Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed.
Reg. 56,607 (Nov. 9, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1306); State v. Ash-
croft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1078-79, 1082-84 (D. Or. 2002).
47. A physician, a pharmacist, and a number of terminally ill patients
were allowed to intervene. State v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 1084.
48. Id. at 1084-85.
49. Id. at 1087-93. An appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is
expected. Ashbel S. Green, Suicide Law May Go to the 9th Circuit, OREGONIAN,
Apr. 21, 2002, at Al.
50. See David Sarasohn, Ashcrofl Ruling Stirs the Embers in Oregon, OREGO-
NtAN, Nov. 11, 2001, at BI; Sam Howe Verhovek, Oregon Chafes at Measure to Stop
Assisted Suicides, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1999, at Al.
51. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, 11 J.
ECON. PERSP. 43, 44 (1997).
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of federalism, and will consider their possible application to the
issue of physician-assisted suicide.
A. Competitive Federalism
One group of theories about federalism is "competitive fed-
eralism," the view that states tend to compete with one another
for various objectives and benefits.52 One common version of
this theory asserts that federalism often leads to a "race to the
bottom." For example, if different governments are competing
to have businesses relocate to their area, these governments
might end up topping one another not only for the generosity of
the tax benefits and subsidies offered, but also for the laxness of
their pollution, employee safety, and employee-rights regula-
tions. The notion of calling such competition a "race to the bot-
tom" is that the competition might lead to results (as in the
example of the ever-decreasing protections for workers and the
environment) which were contrary to the common good.
There are other circumstances, where there might be,
instead, a "race to the top,""3 where the competition was seen as
creating socially beneficial results, or at least morally neutral ben-
efits for some class(es) of persons. Some have argued, for exam-
ple, that there is competition among the states to create the most
"efficient" rules for the regulation of commercial activities.54
While there is little evidence that Oregon's legalization of
physician-assisted suicide should be seen as part of some compe-
tition with other states to attract residents, health care provision
generally could easily be part of such a contest.55
52. See, e.g., THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG
GOVERNMENTS (1990).
53. See, e.g., F. H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, Welfare Magnets: The Race
for the Top, 5 S. CT. ECON. REV. 141 (1997).
54. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE LJ. 2359, 2361 (1998) ("There is a substantial
literature... indicating that shareholders have benefitted from the federal sys-
tem of corporate law by its production of corporate codes that, for the most
part, maximize share value.").
55. As it happens, Oregon has the reputation for quite good hospice care
and innovative, if sometimes controversial, ideas about the rationing of health
care and health care insurance. (If one had either an active imagination or a
highly cynical disposition, one might also speculate that a state's provision of
end-of-life services and laws could serve as a means for the state to obtain funds
from estate taxes; however, for the moment at least, this seems far-fetched as a
characterization of the motivation of those supporting reform proposals.)
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B. Sorting and Responsiveness
An alternative theory is one of sorting-a theory that could
be seen as connected to the idea of the states as laboratories for
experimentation, discussed earlier. Under this view of American
federalism, the heterogeneity of ways of life and views of the
good are more conveniently dealt with by allowing different
states and local governments to reflect different values. While
Vermont or New York, say, might recognize same-sex unions and
offer benefits to non-married cohabitants, perhaps Utah or Loui-
siana might deny benefits to same-sex and non-married couples,
and try instead to create a more binding form of marriage. Simi-
larly, the "libertarian-inclined" State of Oregon might have a dis-
tinctively different approach to physician-assisted suicide and the
right to die than might a state influenced by a large population
of devout Catholics among its citizens.5 6
Even if one does not think in terms of large value differ-
ences from region to region (or from state to state), there will
inevitably be noticeable demographic differences. Federalism, in
particular decentralization of decision-making, is often justified
by such differences. "The hope is that state and local govern-
ments, being closer to the people, will be more responsive to the
particular preferences of their constituencies and will be able to
find new and better ways to provide these services.
57
C. Federalism and Efficiency
Some economists have argued for an application of federal-
ist principles such that the central government is involved only
with those issues which involve significant externalities across
geographically wide areas (e.g., environmental issues).5 8 Beyond
the question of externalities, economic federalism would simply
inquire (perhaps unsurprisingly) as to which level of government
could provide the services in question most efficiently. The pre-
sumptive efficiency of (more) local government under this
56. One obvious example of a state reacting to physician-assisted suicide
in a way opposite to Oregon was Michigan, which responded to Dr. Jack Kevor-
kian's highly publicized physician-assisted suicides by repeated prosecutions
and by express criminalization of the act. See, e.g., Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent
Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide-June 2002, at http://www.willamette.
edu/wucl/pas/pasupdatejune2002.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2002) (on file
with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
57. Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37J. ECON. LITERATURE
1120, 1120 (1999).
58. See, e.g., WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM (1972).
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model is tied to an analysis similar to the discussion of sorting
and responsiveness discussed in the prior section. 59
For physician-assisted suicide-to whatever extent one might
think it proper to think of this as a "provision of a service"-
more local decision-making would seem appropriate, unless and
until the local rules had significant spillover effects. As already
discussed, as long as the state laws on physician-assisted suicide
have a residency requirement, or something comparable, there
are unlikely to be substantial spillover effects.
D. State's Rights and Sovereign Immunity
There are also legal theories of federalism, ideas about what
the United States Constitution requires by way of the division of
powers between the federal government and the states. The
United States Supreme Court has recently decided a series of
cases which have provided substantial protection for state sover-
eignty and state prerogatives, as against federal power. Many of
these cases are based directly or indirectly on the Eleventh
Amendment, 6 which by its text seems merely to put a small con-
straint on the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, but
which has been held to be a broader recognition of state sover-
eign immunity.6' Parallel with the broad reading of the Eleventh
Amendment has been an ever-narrower reading of Congress'
powers to bind the states under either the Commerce Clause6 2 or
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 Some of the latter
cases have indicated that certain subjects are presumptively
59. See Truman Bewley, A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expendi-
tures, 49 ECONOMETRIcA 713 (1981); Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
60. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
61. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,
39 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the
Eleventh Amendment as reflecting a "broad constitutional principle of sover-
eign immunity").
62. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
63. See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)
(analyzing the case primarily under Section Five); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (discussing both the Commerce Clause and Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment). Garrett seems to limit the scope of federal regula-
tion authorized by Section Five to protection of oppressed groups who already
have constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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beyond Congress' power to regulate: non-economic regulation,
especially if it concerns the family.6
4
There may well be no connection between this line of cases
and the issue of physician-assisted suicide, but it is just possible,
depending on the nature and wording of the federal regulation
in question, that this Supreme Court might invalidate a federal
law which interfered with the state regulation of medical prac-
tices-though it is more likely that such federal regulation would
be upheld. Regulations which do not impose liability on the
states themselves, and do not "commandeer" state governments
to do the bidding of the federal government,6" are usually
upheld.
E. Application to Physician-Assisted Suicide
Both the Oregon law and most other recent proposals
66
impose a residency requirement on those who would take advan-
tage of the legalization of physician-assisted suicide. That alone
should be sufficient to mollify most concerns about one state's
laws undermining the policies of other states, or about there
being a ghoulish "race to the bottom" for the medical-suicide
"tourist trade." Here, it is interesting to contrast the likely effects
of two different controversial state health legalizations-physi-
cian-assisted suicide and medical marijuana67 _and perhaps add
in the non-medical example of same-sex marriage. Though
some commentators had suggested that there might be a strong
financial incentive for states to enact same-sex marriage in order
to gain the tourism dollars from those who would take advantage
64. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 599 (regulation of domestic relations); Lopez,
514 U.S. at 549 (criminal law matter without obvious interstate elements or
effects).
65. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, on the basis
that it would either require states to implement federal regulations or to accept
ownership of radioactive waste).
66. See, e.g., supra note 10 and accompanying text.
67. As of February 2001, nine states had laws that protected medicinal
marijuana users from state prosecutions. Tom Mashberg, Debate Swirls Over
Marijuana as Medicine, B. HERALD, Feb. 25, 2001, at Al. However, in May 2001
the Supreme Court decided that there was no "medical necessity" exception to
the federal statutory prohibition on the manufacture and distribution of mari-
juana. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 523 U.S. 483 (2001).
Given federal law supremacy, the states are powerless to legalize marijuana
fully; full legalization will require a change in the federal law (just as a federal
law banning physician-assisted suicide would trump state actions attempting to
make assisted suicide legal).
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of such laws,6" there has in fact been no rush to that "top" or
"bottom," because the proposal is sufficiently controversial that
there will inevitably be serious resistance to the proposal,
whatever the financial (or other) incentives might be for passage.
Similarly, for physician-assisted suicide and medical marijuana:
whatever incentives there might be for passage, the proposals
inevitably evoke sufficiently strong ideological opposition that
the marginal financial (or other) incentives are unlikely to cause
quick passage-contrast rules like those regarding corporate gov-
ernance or securities regulation, where those favoring business-
friendly rules are likely to be well-organized and have a strong
financial incentive in passage, while opponents are unlikely to be
either strongly organized or strongly motivated.
Consider also one response to physician-assisted suicide: the
federal legislation that prohibited the use of federal funds for
physician-assisted suicide.6 9 How that decision comports with
federalist principles depends on one's views on at least two issues.
First, does one consider physician-assisted suicide to be an
acceptable option for individuals to use and states to authorize?
Those who do not think so would not be inclined to think of
physician-assisted suicide as a matter on which states should be
allowed, or encouraged, to "experiment," and therefore, federal
intervention to discourage or prohibit physician-assisted suicide
would be appropriate.
Second, even assuming that physician-assisted suicide is an
appropriate matter for state choice, 70 what is the baseline against
which federal funding decisions are to be evaluated? If one con-
siders the baseline to be "no funding," then a decision not to
offer federal funds to physician-assisted suicides in Oregon seems
entirely acceptable. This is an experiment of that state, and to
require the citizens of other states, including states whose citi-
zens sharply disagree with the practice, to subsidize Oregon's
experiment, seems contrary to the whole notion of "the states as
68. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 26; Tammerlin Drummond, The Manying
Kind, TIME, May 14, 2001, at 52 (indicating that 80% of the civil union licenses
issued to date have been to out-of-state residents, and that civil unions have
contributed to Vermont's tourism industry).
69. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
70. As discussed earlier, supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text, there is
a sense in which state "autonomy" to experiment under federalism could be
analogized to the autonomy given to individuals under some form ofJohn Stu-
art Mill's "harm principle" (state criminalization is appropriate only where indi-
vidual actions harm other people). While the analogy may be suggestive, it also
has limitations: the constraints on state "autonomy" would likely be individual
rights, moral principles, and the social good, not some general notion of "harm
to other states."
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laboratories." Each state, as experimenter, should make its own
decisions and live with the costs and benefits of those decisions.
On the other hand, if the federal decision to block funds is
seen against a baseline of general funding for medical proce-
dures, then the federal decision is less a matter of a "failure to
subsidize," fully justified under federalist principles, and more a
matter of the federal government trying to undermnine the practice.
The inverse of the prior analysis then applies: just as experi-
menting states have no right to be subsidized by (the citizens of)
other states, so they have a right not to be undermined by the
federal government, representing the citizens of other states.
There is no easy or obvious conclusion regarding the proper
baseline for this analysis,7" and the analysis raises conceptual,
moral, and political questions far beyond the scope of this piece.
CONCLUSION
Under federalist principles, which prescribe the separation
of political decision-making among different levels of govern-
ment, it seems natural that some states might choose to legalize
physician-assisted suicide, because it reflects the values of the citi-
zens of those states. Additionally, it is beneficial that there be
such "experiments" going on, as long as the spillover effects of
the experiment can be minimized. At the moment, Oregon is
the only such experiment in the United States, but it may be a
sufficient "laboratory" for ascertaining the likely long-term effects
of legalization.
71. A similar question is obviously raised by federal funding of abortions.
See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding from constitutional
challenge the Hyde Amendment, which withheld Medicaid funding from
almost all abortions); Michael J. Perry, My the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong
in the Hyde Anendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. Rsv.
1113 (1980).
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